Long-term trends in the online prominence and sentiment of tyre brands

by David Barnett and Chris Anthony

Following some 20 years of ongoing cooperation between Tyres & Accessories and analyst David Barnett in the field of online tyre brand analysis, here Stobbs presents the results of a new study looking at the online prominence and sentiment of tyre brands.

The previous research was produced by Envisional and NetNames between 2005 and 2017, plus a recent study by Stobbs in January 2024. For the purposes of this report, the January 2024 data has been redesignated as the 2023 study for obvious chronological reasons and because it was largely reflective of the previous long-term data.

Set in the context of the earlier research, the latest study utilises a new and improved methodology for quantifying brand prominence and sentiment, as originally outlined in the study of the top 100 most valuable global brands in 2023. The basic calculation frameworks are outlined in Appendix A [of the previous study].

In the study, we consider a set of 150 tyre brands drawn from various sources, including Tyres & Accessories' list of leading tyre companies; Brand Finance's list of most valuable tyre brands, and also incorporating all brands considered in the previous NetNames/Envisional studies. The methodology involves the use of a series of generic tyre-related search queries to bring back a set of pages for analysis, resulting in a dataset of 3,918 distinct webpage URLs. Findings are based on searches and analysis carried out on 19-Nov-2024, utilising results returned on the first page of Google.com, browsing from a UK-based IP address.

The brands with the highest prominence scores are shown in Figure 1 and Table 1. The brands with the highest positive sentiment scores (i.e. the most favourably-referenced brands) are shown in Figure 2 and Table 2.

Figure 1: Top 30 brands by prominence score

Rank	Brand	Prominence score
1	Michelin	1.841
2	Continental	1.449
3	Pirelli	0.835
4	Goodyear	0.741
5	Bridgestone	0.564
6	Falken	0.557
7	Dunlop	0.471
8	Toyo	0.319
9	Hankook	0.275
10	Yokohama	0.242

Table 1: Top ten brands by prominence score

Figure 2: Top 30 brands by sentiment score

Rank	Brand	Sentiment score
1	Michelin	34.14
2	Continental	25.52
3	Falken	19.05
4	Bridgestone	18.55
5	Goodyear	17.16
6	Pirelli	16.86
7	Toyo	15.14
8	iLink	13.92
9	Dunlop	12.55
10	Kumho	12.13

Table 2: Top ten brands by sentiment score

Overall, as in the previous study, Michelin achieves the position of being both the most prominent and the most positively-referenced brand. Of the top ten most valuable tyre brands (as compiled by Brand Finance), nine appear in the list of the top ten most prominent brands (together with Falken, in sixth position, and with the exception of Giti, the 17th most prominent overall), and seven feature in the list of the top ten most positively referenced (together with Falken (3rd), iLink (8th) and Kumho (10th)). Broadly, there is a moderate positive correlation between brand value and both online prominence (correlation coefficient = +0.71) and online sentiment (correlation = +0.79) (Figures 3 and 4).

Figure 3: Comparison of online brand prominence score with brand value (for the top ten most valuable brands)

Figure 4: Comparison of online brand sentiment score with brand value (for the top ten most valuable brands)

Overall, only eight of the analysed brands achieved sentiment scores which were negative, of which the bottom three were Interstate (-2.14), Fullway (-0.51) and Headway (-0.50), based on identified mentions on 20, 8 and 13 pages, respectively.

It is also informative to compare the performances of the brands with those from the previous NetNames / Envisional studies (for those brands which were included in these earlier analyses), and with the most recent Stobbs study ('2023'). For comparisons of prominence, the scores from the earlier studies were renormalised (scaled), so that the mean score across all brands featured in the 2017 study was the same as that for the same group of brands from the 2023 study. The resulting trends over time in the relative prominences of the set of brands analysed previously is shown in Figure 5.

Michelin retains the top spot it has consistently held in all previous studies - though this year by an increased margin - and with the previous 'big six' (Michelin, Goodyear, Continental, Pirelli, Bridgestone, Dunlop) remaining within the top seven brands, though (as in the previous study) again joined by Falken, in sixth position above Dunlop. The other most significant change since the previous study is the drop in relative prominence of Goodyear, having fallen below Pirelli, whose prominence has risen slightly.

Similarly, we can also compare the relative sentiment rankings of the set of 18 brands which have been considered in some or all of the previous studies (Figure 6).

Figure 5: Trends over time in (normalised) prominence score, for the set of brands analysed previously

Figure 6: Trends over time in sentiment ranking, for the set of brands analysed previously

All 18 of these brands continue to receive positive sentiment scores overall (ranging from +1.14 for GT Radial to +34.14 for Michelin - compared with a score of +27.66 for this brand from 2023), indicating that commentary is generally favourable overall for this set of brands. In terms of the degree of positive sentiment, Michelin holds the top position it held in 2023 and in nine of the other previous studies (including a continuous run between 2007 and 2014). Falken continues to climb up the rankings (from 14th in 2015, 9th in 2016 and 2017, and 6th in 2023, to 3rd in 2024), and with other significant changes since the previous study seen for Kumho (up 4 places from 13th to 9th), Yokohama (up 3 from 15th to 12th), Nexen (down 6 from 7th to 13th) and Firestone (down 4 from 12th to 16th).

Finally, it is also possible to calculate a rudimentary 'brand strength score' for those brands for which a monetary brand value is provided by Brand Finance, based on a combination of (normalised versions of) the prominence and sentiment scores, and the brand value itself. The brand strength scores for these top ten brands, and the corresponding values from 2023, are shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Brand strength scores for the top ten most valuable brands, from the 2023 and 2024 (current) studies

This article was first published on 16 December 2024 as part of the Tyres & Accessories 'Trends & Facts 2024' report:

https://www.tyrepress.com/epaper/trends-facts-2024-by-tyres-accessories/

Further explorations in brand colour disputes

Part 1: Stratos vs Freia Boble

Given my previous explorations with colour-mark similarity measurement, a recent interesting case^[1] caught my eye. The Norwegian IP Office has rejected (pending appeal) an application by manufacturer Orkla to register the blue shade Pantone 2144 C as a colour mark for 'aerated chocolate' (for its Stratos brand), despite a previous court decision that the company was entitled to protection of the shade through long-term and widespread use.

The earlier case arose when competitor Mondelez launched a similar product (Freia Boble) in 2023 using a "strikingly similar" shade of blue (Pantone 2145 C)^[2]. Orkla's challenge was successful, with Mondelez ordered to change its packaging and pay damages.

But how similar actually are these shades? My previous work on comparison of marks^[3] focuses on the idea that, for certain categories of mark (such as colour), the difference between pairs of marks can be precisely quantified - and that, by extension, it ought to be possible to formulate trademark protection guidelines outlining the threshold to which protection would apply (with a geometric 'distance' of 10 units in RGB colour space being suggested as, perhaps, a reasonable rule of thumb)^[4]. 

Pantone 2144 C (Stratos) is RGB (0,103,185), whilst Pantone 2145 C (Freia Boble original launch) is RGB (0,78,168). The RGB 'distance' between these two colours is 30 units, making them objectively ('only') 93.155% similar (by expressing the distance as a proportion of the maximum possible distance between two colours in RGB space). 

Was the original case decision 'correct'? The two shades are noticeably different when viewed side by side, but how noticeable is the difference when the products are viewed separately? How close should product types need to be in order to 'offset' a lesser degree of similarity between colour marks, when assessing potential 'clashes'?

Part 2: Heinz

So, brand colours - my new favourite thing - are apparently everywhere at the moment. But the material generally does not bode well for brand consistency (or any prospect of a robust quantitative framework for colour mark protection).

For example, Pantone, the global colour standard, released a 'Heinz 57 Red' shade "emblematic of the [ketchup's] enticing appetizing arousing juicy red color [sic]"^[5,6]. According to Pantone's post on X (and my desktop 'colour picker' tool), this colour is RGB (131,31,31). This is rather different to the 'Heinz Red' offered by various online colour archives - with one source (no pun intended) giving a value of (200,41,34)^[7]. How different are these two shades? Precisely 15.8% different (70 RGB units), according to the distance between these two colours in RGB space, as per my previously-outlined algorithm.

Heinz themselves are rightly very defensive of their ketchup colour, as a means of protecting against refills and counterfeit versions, even going so far as to publish a colour 'cheat sheet'^[8] (see below). On their poster, 'Heinz' colour is (211,32,38), actually 80 units (18.2%) different from 'Pantone Heinz 57 Red' (but only 15 units (3.3%) different from Schemecolor's 'Heinz Red').

For comparison, the closest 'not Heinz' on Heinz's poster, (185,37,35), is 27 units (6.0%) different to 'Heinz', with a spectrum running all the way to (104,51,20) ('Is that even ketchup?'), a whopping 110 units (24.9%) different from 'Heinz' (but only 35 units (8.0%) distinct from 'Pantone Heinz 57 Red').

It's all very confusing...

Part 3: T-Mobile

In this latest instalment of my exploration of brand colour disputes, I consider the case of telecommunications provider T-Mobile (part of Deutsche Telekom). 

T-Mobile is notoriously protective of the magenta colour used in its branding, and has secured a colour trademark registration for 'Pantone Rhodamine Red U' (RGB (228,76,154)^[9]), despite actually using a range of shades in its own marketing. In 2008, the brand (unsuccessfully)^[10] launched a case against rival telecommunications provider Telia for their use of a shade of magenta, followed by a successful case against AT&T subsidiary Aio Wireless in 2014. 

In 2020, T-Mobile targeted insurance provider Lemonade (lemonade.com), despite their shades of magenta being rather different and the facts that the overlap between the areas of business of the companies is tenuous at best. Lemonade ultimately changed the colour of its marketing materials in Germany, before launching an action in Europe to invalidate Deutche Telekom's colour trademark^[11], with an initial successful outcome in France^[12]. This had been just the latest in a round of disputes by Deutsche Telekom against companies in a range of industry areas, under the justification of the wide portfolio of trademarks held by the organisation in a range of areas, extending to fashion and healthcare.

Lemonade itself has been using shades of pink since its launch in 2015, with a brand association sufficiently strong that the organisation has even commissioned art projects relating to the pink shade #FF0083 (the hexadecimal representation of RGB (255,0,131)), including the creation of an associated portfolio website at ff0083.com (a very nice creative use of a domain name!). 

The predominant colour used by T-Mobile in their branding (as of the 2022 article referenced above) is (of the order of) RGB (228,0,116), and with Lemonade's 'banned' shades including (255,86,173), (184,1,145) and (187,2,142). 

The difference in colour between T-Mobile's trademark and their own brand colour is 85 RGB units (only 80.8% similarity), as compared with the distances between their trademark and Lemonade's three contested colours of 86, 87 and 85 units (and whose distances from T-Mobile's own brand colours are 107, 53, 49 units, respectively). 

Whilst there is some reasonable justification for T-Mobile's earlier cases against companies in the same industry area, the Lemonade case highlights a very aggressive approach against an organisation in an area of business which is a long way from that for which T-Mobile is primarily known. Discussions in my earlier series of articles on the subject have suggested that a formal framework for colour-mark protection should be reasonably expected to include a 'trade-off' between the closeness of the colours of competitor brands and the closeness of their areas of business.

In the case of T-Mobile, however, the organisation appears to be attempting to protect a 'sphere' of colour varations in RGB space of radius approximately 100 units - covering a visually disparate range of shades - across a wide spectrum of areas of business. This 'sphere' (volume 4,188,790 cubic units) would encompass over one-quarter of the total volume of RGB space (255³, or 16,581,375 cubic units) - i.e. the universe of all possible colours - which would clearly be an unsustainable situation if all brands attempted to do so. 

The tools are available to construct a consistent quantitative framework for the protection of colour marks - perhaps it is time the industry looked more closely at putting something in place along these lines.

References

[1] https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/article/the-stratos-saga-continues-uncertain-future-blue-colour-mark-chocolate

[2] https://haavind.no/content/uploads/sites/2/2024/12/Food-beverage-insight-winter-2024.pdf

[3] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/measuring-similarity-marks-overview-suggested-ideas-david-barnett-zo7fe/

[4] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/what-degree-variability-might-covered-within-david-barnett-ajyoe/

[5] https://x.com/pantone/status/1262819916928991232

[6] https://www.linkedin.com/posts/carola-seybold-61482613_color-food-design-activity-7293596033001881600-KYJZ/

[7] https://www.schemecolor.com/heinz-red-color.php

[8] https://www.creativemoment.co/heinz-creates-label-with-the-exact-pantone-reference-of-tomato-ketchup-to-fight-ketchup-fraud

[9] https://icolorpalette.com/color/pantone-rhodamine-red-u

[10] https://www.engadget.com/2008-05-28-t-mobile-loses-magenta-suit-against-telia-we-try-not-to-laugh.html

[11] https://thehustle.co/can-a-corporation-trademark-a-color

[12] https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20201216005880/en/%C2%A0Lemonade-Wins-FreeThePink-Case-Against-Deutsche-Telekom-in-France

This article was first published as a series of LinkedIn postings / articles on 6, 7 and 10 February 2025 at:

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/dnbarnett2001_given-my-previous-explorations-with-colour-mark-activity-7293304831497162754-nQLe/

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/dnbarnett2001_so-brand-colours-my-new-favourite-thing-activity-7293621709687930880-SMMs/

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/further-explorations-brand-colour-disputes-t-mobile-david-barnett-uoble/

Taking action: EU Commission proceedings against online platforms under the Digital Services Act

by David Barnett and Richard Ferguson

Introduction

i. Overview of the Digital Services Act (DSA)

Around one year on from the full implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), we conduct a review of actions taken by the EU Commission regarding online platforms under the scope of the legislation, as reported on the Commission's own 'press corner' website^[1]. 

The DSA concerns the regulation of online platforms such as e-commerce marketplaces, social media platforms, app stores, and hosting and intermediary services (e.g. providers of cloud and web hosting, network infrastructure, Internet service providers, and domain registrars) and aims to "ensure user safety, protect fundamental rights, and create a fair and open online platform environment"^[2]. Specific measures under the DSA include the introduction of 'trusted flagger' status, obligations on traceability of business users, specific requirements for platforms over a specific size ('Very Large Online Platforms' (VLOPs) and search engines (VLOSEs) with over 45 million users in Europe)^[3], and out-of-court dispute resolution systems^[4].

ii. Routes for awareness of breaches

The EU Commission can become aware of potential breaches of the DSA through a number of routes:

• Complaints and reports - Users, consumer organisations, and other stakeholders can file complaints or reports about potential breaches, including instances of illegal content, lack of transparency, or other non-compliance issues.

• Digital Services Coordinators - Each EU member state has a Digital Services Coordinator (DSC) responsible for monitoring and enforcing the DSA at the national level, and can investigate and report breaches to the Commission.

• Proactive monitoring - The Commission itself conducts proactive monitoring and investigations, which can include analysis of internal company documents, conducting interviews with experts, and co-operating with national authorities.

• Transparency reports - VLOPs and VLOSEs are required to publish regular transparency reports detailing their content moderation practices, advertising policies, and other relevant activities. These reports can highlight potential areas of non-compliance.

• External audits - The DSA mandates that VLOPs and VLOSEs undergo independent audits to assess their compliance with the regulations. The findings from these audits can inform the Commission of any breaches.

These mechanisms ensure a comprehensive approach to detecting and addressing non-compliance with the DSA.

iii. Sanctions for DSA breaches

The DSA includes provisions for several possible sanctions (primarily against VLOPs and VLOSEs) which may be imposed as a result of breaches. Key categories of sanctions include:

• Fines - The EU Commission can impose fines of up to 6% of the global turnover of any VLOP or VLOSE found to be in breach of the DSA.

• Periodic penalty payments - These may be imposed by the Commission to ensure compliance with its orders.

• Corrective Measures - The Commission may order the provider to take specific measures to address the breach within a set deadline.

These sanctions are designed to ensure that providers comply with the regulations, with the aim of promoting greater online safety and transparency.

iv. DSA coordination in Ireland

Finally, it is also worth noting that the DSA has designated Comisiún na Meán (Media Commission) as the DSC for Ireland, as an EU member state. Also named as a competent authority for articles related to online marketplaces (Articles 30, 31 and 32) is the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC). Under the terms of the DSA, Comisiún na Meán has powers to investigate, impose fines, and issue compliance notices, and is awarded trusted flagger status. CCPC also has the capacity to launch investigations and issue fines and compliance notices for marketplaces^[5].

Overview of EU Commission actions

The actions taken by the EU Commission relating to online platforms under the DSA fall into a number of high-level categories, and are collected together as such in the overview below. The summaries reflect the actions taken, and the associated grounds, at the time of the initial announcements.

• Platform designations - This category of actions relates to the classification of individual platforms as VLOPs by the EU under the DSA, with the specific obligations which come with that designation. The first group of 17 VLOPs (including Alibaba AliExpress, the Amazon, Apple and Google Play app stores, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Snapchat, TikTok, Twitter, Wikipedia and YouTube) and two VLOSEs (Bing and Google Search) was announced on 25-Apr-2023^[6] and the second set (the adult sites Pornhub, Stripchat and XVideos) on 20-Dec-2023, together with an overview of more stringent rules for VLOPs^[7]. Subsequent designations as VLOPs followed for the e-commerce platforms Shein (26-Apr-2024)^[8] and Temu (31-May-2024)^[9], and the adult content platform XNXX (10-Jul-2024)^[10].

• Formal proceedings - These can be taken against platforms in response to specific issues of concern. Those reported by the EU Commission are outlined below, categorised by the platform against which the action(s) was taken.

• X (formerly Twitter) - The launch of formal proceedings against X related to the dissemination of illegal content (specifically in relation to the Hamas attacks against Israel), measures taken to combat information manipulation and increase transparency, and questions over the platform's 'Blue Checks' scheme (18-Dec-2023)^[11]. Preliminary findings on concerns relating to verified accounts, transparency on advertising, and data access were subsequently served to the platform, indicating the Commission had taken the view that the DSA had been breached (12-Jul-2024)^[12]. These formal proceedings had followed an earlier 'request for information' sent to the platform, concerned their policies on a range of issues. These areas of concern included the dissemination of illegal content and disinformation, gender-based violence, and security, mental well-being and other fundamental rights (12-Oct-2023)^[13].

• TikTok - This action primarily related to concerns about the risk of negative effects and behavioural addictions caused by the platform’s algorithmic system, measures for the protection of minors, and the availability to the Commission of access to data (including questions about a searchable repository for advertisements (19-Feb-2024)^[14]. Subsequent proceedings related to possible non-compliance with the DSA surrounding the launch of TikTok lite in France and Spain - in particular, the potentially addictive nature of the 'Task and Reward Lite' programme (22-Apr-2024)^[15] - and on election risks - specifically, the possibility of manipulation or exploitation of the recommender systems, and questions over the policies on political advertisements and paid-for content (17-Dec-2024)^[16].

• AliExpress - In this case, concerns were raised regarding content moderation and the handling of complaints by the e-commerce platform (particularly in regard to the availability of fake medicines and foods, and of adult content, and the practice of 'hidden links'^[17] to manipulate the platform and circumvent restrictions on the sale of infringing goods), advertising and other system transparency, and the availability of seller data (14-Mar-2024)^[18].

• Meta (Facebook / Instagram) - Regarding the Meta platforms, concerns surrounded practices regarding deceptive advertising and the visibility of political content, in the context of the deprecation of the Meta public insights tool CrowdTangle, and the possible non-compliance of the mechanism to flag illegal content (30-Apr-2024)^[19]. A follow-up action centred on concerns about the physical and mental well-being of minors on the platform, including a lack of effective age-verification tools and privacy, safety and security measures (16-May-2024)^[20].

• Temu - The proceedings in the case of the Temu e-commerce platform related to the sale of non-compliant products in the EU, the algorithms surrounding content recommendation and the addictive design of the service, including issues relating to data availability (31-Oct-2024)^[21].

• EU Commission statements - In some cases, the Commission will issue a formal statement on an area of interest, distinct from an announcement of a formal proceedings action. Two examples in the 'press corner' database include a statement on the suspension of the TikTok Lite Reward programme in the EU (following a prior launch of formal proceedings) (24-Apr-2024)^[22] and one regarding steps announced by LinkedIn to comply with DSA provisions on targeted advertisements (07-Jul-2024)^[23], following a prior request for information (14-Mar-2024)^[24]. The former statement was followed by a subsequent press release announcing the permanent withdrawal of the TikTok rewards programme (05-Aug-2024)^[25].

• Other press releases - the EU Commission 'press corner' archive also includes a number of other releases discussing a range of platform-specific issues. Examples in which the DSA is also referenced are outlined below.

• Viagogo - The press release in this case outlines the commitment by the online ticket marketplace to improve terms and consumer information, following dialogue with the EU Commission and consumer authorities (16-May-2024)^[26].

• Vinted - The e-commerce marketplace for second-hand goods made improvements to the provision pricing and seller information, in order to bring their practices more in line with EU consumer law, and to the quality of its information on refund policies in cases of purchase of counterfeit goods or the non-delivery of items, again following dialogue with the Commission (18-Jun-2024)^[27].

• Meta - The EU Commission announced its coordination of action by national consumer protection authorities against Meta's 'pay or consent' model - essentially, a move by the platform to demand either a subscription fee or the use of customers' personal data in targeted advertising (22-Jul-2024)^[28].

• Temu - The e-commerce platform was urged by the Commission and national authorities to respect EU consumer protection laws, relating to a range of issues surrounding misleading content (such as fake discounts and reviews), measures to influence decision-making (including pressure selling and gamification), and hidden contact details for the platform (08-Nov-2024)^[29].

• Apple - This press release reports the notification to Apple of several potentially prohibited geoblocking practices, across a range of Apple Media Services platforms. Issues include the inability to access interfaces designed for use in other countries, no option for payment methods outside the country of account registration, and no ability to download apps offered in other countries (12-Nov-2024)^[30].

Discussion

Some of the issues raised by the EU Commission are still unresolved, but it is gratifying to see the organisation proactively taking actions against platforms on which problematic issues may be occurring - particularly those which impact consumer safety, have societal impacts, or are causing damage to brand owners. As time goes on, we hope to see the adoption of additional good practices by platforms within the scope of the DSA, such as the EUIPO recommendations for search engines outlined in their recent report^[31,32], and requirements for a more proactive approach to tackling infringements by e-commerce marketplaces, such as the platforms referenced in the 2024 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy^[33,34].

As of the time of writing, no fines have yet been imposed by the Commission, but it may only be a matter of time before this takes place, especially if cases arise where platforms have made commitments, but fail to meet them. One potential example concerns TikTok which, in response to the proceedings referenced previously, has committed to withdraw its Lite Rewards programme from the EU^[35]. It also remains to be seen whether individual platforms may continue to challenge their designation status (i.e. as a VLOP or VLOSE), as a means of exempting themselves from obligations, as was done by Amazon when required to disclose its advertising information in an online archive^[36].  A final point to watch is how the newly-elected EU member state DSCs, responsible for local monitoring and enforcement of the DSA, may continue to develop in importance.

References

[1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/home/en?keywords=dsa

[2] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act_en

[3] https://www.iamstobbs.com/opinion/digital-markets-act-eu-confirms-big-tech-gatekeepers

[4] https://www.iamstobbs.com/opinion/what-is-the-digital-services-act-and-how-will-it-protect-brands-and-support-online-enforcement

[5] https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/what-we-do/the-business-environment/digital-single-market/eu-digital-single-market-aspects/digital-services-act/

[6] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2413

[7] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6763

[8] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2326

[9] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3047

[10] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3723

[11] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6709

[12] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3761

[13] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4953

[14] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_926

[15] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2227

[16] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6487

[17] https://circleid.com/posts/20220510-breaking-the-rules-on-counterfeit-sales-the-use-of-hidden-links

[18] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1485

[19] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373

[20] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2664

[21] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5622

[22] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_2290

[23] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_3172

[24] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-sends-request-information-linkedin-potentially-targeted-advertising-based-sensitive-data

[25] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4161

[26] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2631

[27] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3292

[28] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3862

[29] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5707

[30] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5727

[31] https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/reports/2024_Search_Engines/2024_Search_Engines_FullR_en.pdf

[32] 'Still haven't found what I'm looking for? - The EUIPO report on search-engine practices' [link TBC]

[33] https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2024%20Review%20of%20Notorious%20Markets%20of%20Counterfeiting%20and%20Piracy%20(final).pdf

[34] https://www.iamstobbs.com/opinion/notorious-a-b.i.g.-set-of-markets-for-counterfeiting-and-piracy-to-keep-an-eye-on

[35] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4161

[36] https://www.lewissilkin.com/insights/2024/04/15/amazon-ordered-to-disclose-advertising-information-in-online-archive-102j5bp

This article was first published on 13 February 2025 at:

https://www.iamstobbs.com/opinion/taking-action-eu-commission-proceedings-against-online-platforms-under-the-digital-services-act