Br'AI've New World - Part 1: Brand protection 'clustering' as a candidate task for the application of AI capabilities

Introduction

The issue of 'clustering' in brand protection - that is, the ability to flexibly identify the existence of links between disparate findings^[1] from a brand monitoring solution - is one of the great unsolved problems in the industry^[2].

Clustering has a number of key benefits, including the identification of high-volume or serial infringers to serve as priority targets for enforcement and demonstrate 'bad faith' action, offering the potential for efficient bulk takedowns of groups of associated results in a single action, and the building of a full profile of the activity associated with a particular entity through an OSINT (open-source intelligence)-style investigative approach^[3].

In general, there are several characteristics of any finding/result from a brand monitoring programme which can serve as a basis for clustering, some of which will be dependent on the channel or type of content. Domain names are one of the 'richest' sources of such data points (many of which can be determined through standard look-ups), which can include features of the whois record^[4] such as registrant (owner) and registrar contact details, hosting information (e.g. host IP address and hosting service provider), characteristics of the domain name itself (such as name patterns^[5] and TLD^[6]), and the providers of any MX (mail exchange) record(s) (allowing e-mail functionality) or SSL (secure sockets layer) certificate(s) (i.e. the authentication feature allowing the domain to use an https URL), in addition to features of any associated website. Many of these characteristics can also be relevant to other types of general Internet content, and other features may be applicable to content from other channels (such as seller names in e-commerce marketplace listings).

These features can additionally serve as the basis for more generally quantifying the level of potential threat posed by an identified result, which can be a key process in prioritising the identified results (which may, in general, comprise a large dataset), to identify the priority targets for further analysis, enforcement or content tracking^[7,8].

Clustering analysis techniques

The simplest type of clustering analysis technique - and one which is still the only offering by many brand-protection service providers - is that which is based on the use just of a single particular common characteristic of a particular type (i.e. associated with a specific single 'label', such as the registrant name or host IP address) associated with the set of results in question. For instance, if the name of the registrant of a group of sites is the same for each of the examples, then those sites can be determined all to be connected to each other (if that registrant name is suitably distinctive). This very simple approach is really nothing more than can be achieved through manual analysis (essentially, carrying out a series of 'reverse look-ups') and, while it can have value, the extent of this value is often limited.

Clustering becomes more insightful and useful if links can be drawn on the basis of identical (or similar) characteristics associated with different fields (or labels) in the database of pieces of information associated with the set of 'candidate' findings to be analysed. For example, if a particular e-mail address appears in the whois record of some domains, but in the website content of a series of others, the wider set of both groups of findings can reasonably be assumed to be associated with each other. However, these types of insights are generally much harder to obtain, essentially because it is not known in advance where these commonalities may appear. The situation may become even more complex if links must be followed in order to find the common features - e.g. crawling from a marketplace listing to the associated seller information page, to identify company names, addresses, telephone numbers, etc. These types of instance are where artificial intelligence (AI) tools can potentially begin to provide value.

Specific requirements of an AI tool to carry out clustering analysis

Beyond even the initial complexity described above in constructing an effective clustering tool, there are a number of additional points to consider:

1. Distinctiveness / reliability of the features used as the basis of clustering - The point to be made in this case is essentially that some characteristics of a result will be more reliable than others as a basis for clustering that result with others sharing the same characteristic. Features such as e-mail addresses and telephone numbers are (generally) highly distinctive, unique and diagnostic. Others, such as seller names (especially if relatively generic and identified across different platforms) and host IP addresses (in cases where multiple different web-hosting customers may share the use of a single webserver), may be less so. At the other end of the scale, features such as the use of a common TLD (e.g. if we consider a group of sites which just share the use of a common extension such as .com), reference a common privacy-protection service provider in their whois record, or the observation for a group of domains that they simply happen to have been registered on the same day (unless other characteristics suggesting a link are also present) may, in isolation, be poor indicators of an actual connection between the findings. Accordingly, any clustering tool will need to take account of the differences between the various possible clustering criteria, and 'weight' their contribution to the overall 'strength' of any asserted potential link.


2. Identification of variants - In many cases, even when results are linked, the pieces of information pertaining to that link may be presented in different formats across the various findings, so any clustering tool will need to take a 'fuzzy' approach to its matching. For example, the same telephone number may be presented in a variety of ways (e.g. "01223 435240", "01223435240", "01223 435 240", "+44 (0)1223 435240", "44 1223 435240", etc.). Similarly, in many cases, a particular company name may be presented differently in distinct contexts (e.g. the registrar / hosting provider GoDaddy might variably be cited as "GoDaddy", "Godaddy.com", "GoDaddy.com, LLC", etc. - and in some cases, depending on the nature of the variations, the entities might be better considered to be distinct anyway - e.g. "Alibaba Cloud LLC" vs "Alibaba Cloud (Singapore) Private Limited"). There is also complexity of the type that (for example) "badseller123@gmail.com" and "badseller123@qq.com" may or may not relate to the same actual entity.


3. Analysis of rich content types - Further difficulties arise from the fact that Internet content is becoming increasingly 'rich' (in terms of the ways in which data can be presented) and any truly comprehensive clustering tool would ideally need to be able to interrogate all of these areas of content. Examples for consideration might include text, imagery or audio content embedded in pictures or videos (say, text displayed as a watermark), potentially requiring features such as image analysis, optical character recognition (OCR), etc.

Conclusion

The construction of a truly effective clustering tool able to take account of all the factors discussed in this article is likely to be an extremely difficult problem to solve. However, appropriate application of AI capabilities may be able to provide a stepwise approach towards addressing the issue.

The benefits of successfully doing so will be enormous, potentially building insights and efficiencies into the processes of brand protection monitoring, analysis and enforcement which are essentially not available through any 'classic' approaches. Any service provider able to put a compelling solution of this nature in place in the short to medium term - particularly if it also offers other attractive AI or machine-learning features, such as the option for automatic 'tuning' of search parameters to identify and categorise the most significant results, being able to be 'trained' based on analyst feedback on the quality of the outputs, or the implementation of semi-automated enforcement notice production and sending - may find themselves a long way ahead of their field of mainstream competitors.

References

[1] In referring to a 'finding', in this context I refer to any single result (such as a website / its associated URL) identified via a brand monitoring product or service configured to search the Internet for material of potential interest or concern. 

[2] https://circleid.com/posts/20230525-the-millennium-problems-in-brand-protection

[3] 'Patterns in Brand Monitoring' (D.N. Barnett, Business Expert Press, 2025), Chapter 6: 'Result clustering'

[4] The 'whois' record of a domain gives technical configuration and ownership information for that domain.

[5] e.g. the group of domains all with names of the form ketoXXXYYY.TLD (where 'XXX' is a string of (typically six or seven) random alphabetical characters, 'YYY' is a string of three random digits, and 'TLD' is a low-registration-cost new-gTLD extension such as .sbs or .cloud) which were identified as all being part of a health scam campaign in a 2024 study -
https://www.iamstobbs.com/opinion/health-scam-websites-identifying-related-domains-using-clustering-techniques

[6] The TLD (top-level domain) is the domain name extension - i.e. the part of the name after the dot.

[7] 'Patterns in Brand Monitoring' (D.N. Barnett, Business Expert Press, 2025), Chapter 5: 'Prioritization criteria for specific types of content'

[8] 'Patterns in Brand Monitoring' (D.N. Barnett, Business Expert Press, 2025), Chapter 3: 'Brand content scoring'

This article was first published on 5 March 2025 at:

https://circleid.com/posts/braive-new-world-part-1-brand-protection-clustering-as-a-candidate-task-for-the-application-of-ai-capabilities

Long-term trends in the online prominence and sentiment of tyre brands

by David Barnett and Chris Anthony

Following some 20 years of ongoing cooperation between Tyres & Accessories and analyst David Barnett in the field of online tyre brand analysis, here Stobbs presents the results of a new study looking at the online prominence and sentiment of tyre brands.

The previous research was produced by Envisional and NetNames between 2005 and 2017, plus a recent study by Stobbs in January 2024. For the purposes of this report, the January 2024 data has been redesignated as the 2023 study for obvious chronological reasons and because it was largely reflective of the previous long-term data.

Set in the context of the earlier research, the latest study utilises a new and improved methodology for quantifying brand prominence and sentiment, as originally outlined in the study of the top 100 most valuable global brands in 2023. The basic calculation frameworks are outlined in Appendix A [of the previous study].

In the study, we consider a set of 150 tyre brands drawn from various sources, including Tyres & Accessories' list of leading tyre companies; Brand Finance's list of most valuable tyre brands, and also incorporating all brands considered in the previous NetNames/Envisional studies. The methodology involves the use of a series of generic tyre-related search queries to bring back a set of pages for analysis, resulting in a dataset of 3,918 distinct webpage URLs. Findings are based on searches and analysis carried out on 19-Nov-2024, utilising results returned on the first page of Google.com, browsing from a UK-based IP address.

The brands with the highest prominence scores are shown in Figure 1 and Table 1. The brands with the highest positive sentiment scores (i.e. the most favourably-referenced brands) are shown in Figure 2 and Table 2.

Figure 1: Top 30 brands by prominence score

Rank	Brand	Prominence score
1	Michelin	1.841
2	Continental	1.449
3	Pirelli	0.835
4	Goodyear	0.741
5	Bridgestone	0.564
6	Falken	0.557
7	Dunlop	0.471
8	Toyo	0.319
9	Hankook	0.275
10	Yokohama	0.242

Table 1: Top ten brands by prominence score

Figure 2: Top 30 brands by sentiment score

Rank	Brand	Sentiment score
1	Michelin	34.14
2	Continental	25.52
3	Falken	19.05
4	Bridgestone	18.55
5	Goodyear	17.16
6	Pirelli	16.86
7	Toyo	15.14
8	iLink	13.92
9	Dunlop	12.55
10	Kumho	12.13

Table 2: Top ten brands by sentiment score

Overall, as in the previous study, Michelin achieves the position of being both the most prominent and the most positively-referenced brand. Of the top ten most valuable tyre brands (as compiled by Brand Finance), nine appear in the list of the top ten most prominent brands (together with Falken, in sixth position, and with the exception of Giti, the 17th most prominent overall), and seven feature in the list of the top ten most positively referenced (together with Falken (3rd), iLink (8th) and Kumho (10th)). Broadly, there is a moderate positive correlation between brand value and both online prominence (correlation coefficient = +0.71) and online sentiment (correlation = +0.79) (Figures 3 and 4).

Figure 3: Comparison of online brand prominence score with brand value (for the top ten most valuable brands)

Figure 4: Comparison of online brand sentiment score with brand value (for the top ten most valuable brands)

Overall, only eight of the analysed brands achieved sentiment scores which were negative, of which the bottom three were Interstate (-2.14), Fullway (-0.51) and Headway (-0.50), based on identified mentions on 20, 8 and 13 pages, respectively.

It is also informative to compare the performances of the brands with those from the previous NetNames / Envisional studies (for those brands which were included in these earlier analyses), and with the most recent Stobbs study ('2023'). For comparisons of prominence, the scores from the earlier studies were renormalised (scaled), so that the mean score across all brands featured in the 2017 study was the same as that for the same group of brands from the 2023 study. The resulting trends over time in the relative prominences of the set of brands analysed previously is shown in Figure 5.

Michelin retains the top spot it has consistently held in all previous studies - though this year by an increased margin - and with the previous 'big six' (Michelin, Goodyear, Continental, Pirelli, Bridgestone, Dunlop) remaining within the top seven brands, though (as in the previous study) again joined by Falken, in sixth position above Dunlop. The other most significant change since the previous study is the drop in relative prominence of Goodyear, having fallen below Pirelli, whose prominence has risen slightly.

Similarly, we can also compare the relative sentiment rankings of the set of 18 brands which have been considered in some or all of the previous studies (Figure 6).

Figure 5: Trends over time in (normalised) prominence score, for the set of brands analysed previously

Figure 6: Trends over time in sentiment ranking, for the set of brands analysed previously

All 18 of these brands continue to receive positive sentiment scores overall (ranging from +1.14 for GT Radial to +34.14 for Michelin - compared with a score of +27.66 for this brand from 2023), indicating that commentary is generally favourable overall for this set of brands. In terms of the degree of positive sentiment, Michelin holds the top position it held in 2023 and in nine of the other previous studies (including a continuous run between 2007 and 2014). Falken continues to climb up the rankings (from 14th in 2015, 9th in 2016 and 2017, and 6th in 2023, to 3rd in 2024), and with other significant changes since the previous study seen for Kumho (up 4 places from 13th to 9th), Yokohama (up 3 from 15th to 12th), Nexen (down 6 from 7th to 13th) and Firestone (down 4 from 12th to 16th).

Finally, it is also possible to calculate a rudimentary 'brand strength score' for those brands for which a monetary brand value is provided by Brand Finance, based on a combination of (normalised versions of) the prominence and sentiment scores, and the brand value itself. The brand strength scores for these top ten brands, and the corresponding values from 2023, are shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Brand strength scores for the top ten most valuable brands, from the 2023 and 2024 (current) studies

This article was first published on 16 December 2024 as part of the Tyres & Accessories 'Trends & Facts 2024' report:

https://www.tyrepress.com/epaper/trends-facts-2024-by-tyres-accessories/

Further explorations in brand colour disputes

Part 1: Stratos vs Freia Boble

Given my previous explorations with colour-mark similarity measurement, a recent interesting case^[1] caught my eye. The Norwegian IP Office has rejected (pending appeal) an application by manufacturer Orkla to register the blue shade Pantone 2144 C as a colour mark for 'aerated chocolate' (for its Stratos brand), despite a previous court decision that the company was entitled to protection of the shade through long-term and widespread use.

The earlier case arose when competitor Mondelez launched a similar product (Freia Boble) in 2023 using a "strikingly similar" shade of blue (Pantone 2145 C)^[2]. Orkla's challenge was successful, with Mondelez ordered to change its packaging and pay damages.

But how similar actually are these shades? My previous work on comparison of marks^[3] focuses on the idea that, for certain categories of mark (such as colour), the difference between pairs of marks can be precisely quantified - and that, by extension, it ought to be possible to formulate trademark protection guidelines outlining the threshold to which protection would apply (with a geometric 'distance' of 10 units in RGB colour space being suggested as, perhaps, a reasonable rule of thumb)^[4]. 

Pantone 2144 C (Stratos) is RGB (0,103,185), whilst Pantone 2145 C (Freia Boble original launch) is RGB (0,78,168). The RGB 'distance' between these two colours is 30 units, making them objectively ('only') 93.155% similar (by expressing the distance as a proportion of the maximum possible distance between two colours in RGB space). 

Was the original case decision 'correct'? The two shades are noticeably different when viewed side by side, but how noticeable is the difference when the products are viewed separately? How close should product types need to be in order to 'offset' a lesser degree of similarity between colour marks, when assessing potential 'clashes'?

Part 2: Heinz

So, brand colours - my new favourite thing - are apparently everywhere at the moment. But the material generally does not bode well for brand consistency (or any prospect of a robust quantitative framework for colour mark protection).

For example, Pantone, the global colour standard, released a 'Heinz 57 Red' shade "emblematic of the [ketchup's] enticing appetizing arousing juicy red color [sic]"^[5,6]. According to Pantone's post on X (and my desktop 'colour picker' tool), this colour is RGB (131,31,31). This is rather different to the 'Heinz Red' offered by various online colour archives - with one source (no pun intended) giving a value of (200,41,34)^[7]. How different are these two shades? Precisely 15.8% different (70 RGB units), according to the distance between these two colours in RGB space, as per my previously-outlined algorithm.

Heinz themselves are rightly very defensive of their ketchup colour, as a means of protecting against refills and counterfeit versions, even going so far as to publish a colour 'cheat sheet'^[8] (see below). On their poster, 'Heinz' colour is (211,32,38), actually 80 units (18.2%) different from 'Pantone Heinz 57 Red' (but only 15 units (3.3%) different from Schemecolor's 'Heinz Red').

For comparison, the closest 'not Heinz' on Heinz's poster, (185,37,35), is 27 units (6.0%) different to 'Heinz', with a spectrum running all the way to (104,51,20) ('Is that even ketchup?'), a whopping 110 units (24.9%) different from 'Heinz' (but only 35 units (8.0%) distinct from 'Pantone Heinz 57 Red').

It's all very confusing...

Part 3: T-Mobile

In this latest instalment of my exploration of brand colour disputes, I consider the case of telecommunications provider T-Mobile (part of Deutsche Telekom). 

T-Mobile is notoriously protective of the magenta colour used in its branding, and has secured a colour trademark registration for 'Pantone Rhodamine Red U' (RGB (228,76,154)^[9]), despite actually using a range of shades in its own marketing. In 2008, the brand (unsuccessfully)^[10] launched a case against rival telecommunications provider Telia for their use of a shade of magenta, followed by a successful case against AT&T subsidiary Aio Wireless in 2014. 

In 2020, T-Mobile targeted insurance provider Lemonade (lemonade.com), despite their shades of magenta being rather different and the facts that the overlap between the areas of business of the companies is tenuous at best. Lemonade ultimately changed the colour of its marketing materials in Germany, before launching an action in Europe to invalidate Deutche Telekom's colour trademark^[11], with an initial successful outcome in France^[12]. This had been just the latest in a round of disputes by Deutsche Telekom against companies in a range of industry areas, under the justification of the wide portfolio of trademarks held by the organisation in a range of areas, extending to fashion and healthcare.

Lemonade itself has been using shades of pink since its launch in 2015, with a brand association sufficiently strong that the organisation has even commissioned art projects relating to the pink shade #FF0083 (the hexadecimal representation of RGB (255,0,131)), including the creation of an associated portfolio website at ff0083.com (a very nice creative use of a domain name!). 

The predominant colour used by T-Mobile in their branding (as of the 2022 article referenced above) is (of the order of) RGB (228,0,116), and with Lemonade's 'banned' shades including (255,86,173), (184,1,145) and (187,2,142). 

The difference in colour between T-Mobile's trademark and their own brand colour is 85 RGB units (only 80.8% similarity), as compared with the distances between their trademark and Lemonade's three contested colours of 86, 87 and 85 units (and whose distances from T-Mobile's own brand colours are 107, 53, 49 units, respectively). 

Whilst there is some reasonable justification for T-Mobile's earlier cases against companies in the same industry area, the Lemonade case highlights a very aggressive approach against an organisation in an area of business which is a long way from that for which T-Mobile is primarily known. Discussions in my earlier series of articles on the subject have suggested that a formal framework for colour-mark protection should be reasonably expected to include a 'trade-off' between the closeness of the colours of competitor brands and the closeness of their areas of business.

In the case of T-Mobile, however, the organisation appears to be attempting to protect a 'sphere' of colour varations in RGB space of radius approximately 100 units - covering a visually disparate range of shades - across a wide spectrum of areas of business. This 'sphere' (volume 4,188,790 cubic units) would encompass over one-quarter of the total volume of RGB space (255³, or 16,581,375 cubic units) - i.e. the universe of all possible colours - which would clearly be an unsustainable situation if all brands attempted to do so. 

The tools are available to construct a consistent quantitative framework for the protection of colour marks - perhaps it is time the industry looked more closely at putting something in place along these lines.

References

[1] https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/article/the-stratos-saga-continues-uncertain-future-blue-colour-mark-chocolate

[2] https://haavind.no/content/uploads/sites/2/2024/12/Food-beverage-insight-winter-2024.pdf

[3] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/measuring-similarity-marks-overview-suggested-ideas-david-barnett-zo7fe/

[4] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/what-degree-variability-might-covered-within-david-barnett-ajyoe/

[5] https://x.com/pantone/status/1262819916928991232

[6] https://www.linkedin.com/posts/carola-seybold-61482613_color-food-design-activity-7293596033001881600-KYJZ/

[7] https://www.schemecolor.com/heinz-red-color.php

[8] https://www.creativemoment.co/heinz-creates-label-with-the-exact-pantone-reference-of-tomato-ketchup-to-fight-ketchup-fraud

[9] https://icolorpalette.com/color/pantone-rhodamine-red-u

[10] https://www.engadget.com/2008-05-28-t-mobile-loses-magenta-suit-against-telia-we-try-not-to-laugh.html

[11] https://thehustle.co/can-a-corporation-trademark-a-color

[12] https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20201216005880/en/%C2%A0Lemonade-Wins-FreeThePink-Case-Against-Deutsche-Telekom-in-France

This article was first published as a series of LinkedIn postings / articles on 6, 7 and 10 February 2025 at:

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/dnbarnett2001_given-my-previous-explorations-with-colour-mark-activity-7293304831497162754-nQLe/

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/dnbarnett2001_so-brand-colours-my-new-favourite-thing-activity-7293621709687930880-SMMs/

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/further-explorations-brand-colour-disputes-t-mobile-david-barnett-uoble/

Taking action: EU Commission proceedings against online platforms under the Digital Services Act

by David Barnett and Richard Ferguson

Introduction

i. Overview of the Digital Services Act (DSA)

Around one year on from the full implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA), we conduct a review of actions taken by the EU Commission regarding online platforms under the scope of the legislation, as reported on the Commission's own 'press corner' website^[1]. 

The DSA concerns the regulation of online platforms such as e-commerce marketplaces, social media platforms, app stores, and hosting and intermediary services (e.g. providers of cloud and web hosting, network infrastructure, Internet service providers, and domain registrars) and aims to "ensure user safety, protect fundamental rights, and create a fair and open online platform environment"^[2]. Specific measures under the DSA include the introduction of 'trusted flagger' status, obligations on traceability of business users, specific requirements for platforms over a specific size ('Very Large Online Platforms' (VLOPs) and search engines (VLOSEs) with over 45 million users in Europe)^[3], and out-of-court dispute resolution systems^[4].

ii. Routes for awareness of breaches

The EU Commission can become aware of potential breaches of the DSA through a number of routes:

• Complaints and reports - Users, consumer organisations, and other stakeholders can file complaints or reports about potential breaches, including instances of illegal content, lack of transparency, or other non-compliance issues.

• Digital Services Coordinators - Each EU member state has a Digital Services Coordinator (DSC) responsible for monitoring and enforcing the DSA at the national level, and can investigate and report breaches to the Commission.

• Proactive monitoring - The Commission itself conducts proactive monitoring and investigations, which can include analysis of internal company documents, conducting interviews with experts, and co-operating with national authorities.

• Transparency reports - VLOPs and VLOSEs are required to publish regular transparency reports detailing their content moderation practices, advertising policies, and other relevant activities. These reports can highlight potential areas of non-compliance.

• External audits - The DSA mandates that VLOPs and VLOSEs undergo independent audits to assess their compliance with the regulations. The findings from these audits can inform the Commission of any breaches.

These mechanisms ensure a comprehensive approach to detecting and addressing non-compliance with the DSA.

iii. Sanctions for DSA breaches

The DSA includes provisions for several possible sanctions (primarily against VLOPs and VLOSEs) which may be imposed as a result of breaches. Key categories of sanctions include:

• Fines - The EU Commission can impose fines of up to 6% of the global turnover of any VLOP or VLOSE found to be in breach of the DSA.

• Periodic penalty payments - These may be imposed by the Commission to ensure compliance with its orders.

• Corrective Measures - The Commission may order the provider to take specific measures to address the breach within a set deadline.

These sanctions are designed to ensure that providers comply with the regulations, with the aim of promoting greater online safety and transparency.

iv. DSA coordination in Ireland

Finally, it is also worth noting that the DSA has designated Comisiún na Meán (Media Commission) as the DSC for Ireland, as an EU member state. Also named as a competent authority for articles related to online marketplaces (Articles 30, 31 and 32) is the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC). Under the terms of the DSA, Comisiún na Meán has powers to investigate, impose fines, and issue compliance notices, and is awarded trusted flagger status. CCPC also has the capacity to launch investigations and issue fines and compliance notices for marketplaces^[5].

Overview of EU Commission actions

The actions taken by the EU Commission relating to online platforms under the DSA fall into a number of high-level categories, and are collected together as such in the overview below. The summaries reflect the actions taken, and the associated grounds, at the time of the initial announcements.

• Platform designations - This category of actions relates to the classification of individual platforms as VLOPs by the EU under the DSA, with the specific obligations which come with that designation. The first group of 17 VLOPs (including Alibaba AliExpress, the Amazon, Apple and Google Play app stores, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Snapchat, TikTok, Twitter, Wikipedia and YouTube) and two VLOSEs (Bing and Google Search) was announced on 25-Apr-2023^[6] and the second set (the adult sites Pornhub, Stripchat and XVideos) on 20-Dec-2023, together with an overview of more stringent rules for VLOPs^[7]. Subsequent designations as VLOPs followed for the e-commerce platforms Shein (26-Apr-2024)^[8] and Temu (31-May-2024)^[9], and the adult content platform XNXX (10-Jul-2024)^[10].

• Formal proceedings - These can be taken against platforms in response to specific issues of concern. Those reported by the EU Commission are outlined below, categorised by the platform against which the action(s) was taken.

• X (formerly Twitter) - The launch of formal proceedings against X related to the dissemination of illegal content (specifically in relation to the Hamas attacks against Israel), measures taken to combat information manipulation and increase transparency, and questions over the platform's 'Blue Checks' scheme (18-Dec-2023)^[11]. Preliminary findings on concerns relating to verified accounts, transparency on advertising, and data access were subsequently served to the platform, indicating the Commission had taken the view that the DSA had been breached (12-Jul-2024)^[12]. These formal proceedings had followed an earlier 'request for information' sent to the platform, concerned their policies on a range of issues. These areas of concern included the dissemination of illegal content and disinformation, gender-based violence, and security, mental well-being and other fundamental rights (12-Oct-2023)^[13].

• TikTok - This action primarily related to concerns about the risk of negative effects and behavioural addictions caused by the platform’s algorithmic system, measures for the protection of minors, and the availability to the Commission of access to data (including questions about a searchable repository for advertisements (19-Feb-2024)^[14]. Subsequent proceedings related to possible non-compliance with the DSA surrounding the launch of TikTok lite in France and Spain - in particular, the potentially addictive nature of the 'Task and Reward Lite' programme (22-Apr-2024)^[15] - and on election risks - specifically, the possibility of manipulation or exploitation of the recommender systems, and questions over the policies on political advertisements and paid-for content (17-Dec-2024)^[16].

• AliExpress - In this case, concerns were raised regarding content moderation and the handling of complaints by the e-commerce platform (particularly in regard to the availability of fake medicines and foods, and of adult content, and the practice of 'hidden links'^[17] to manipulate the platform and circumvent restrictions on the sale of infringing goods), advertising and other system transparency, and the availability of seller data (14-Mar-2024)^[18].

• Meta (Facebook / Instagram) - Regarding the Meta platforms, concerns surrounded practices regarding deceptive advertising and the visibility of political content, in the context of the deprecation of the Meta public insights tool CrowdTangle, and the possible non-compliance of the mechanism to flag illegal content (30-Apr-2024)^[19]. A follow-up action centred on concerns about the physical and mental well-being of minors on the platform, including a lack of effective age-verification tools and privacy, safety and security measures (16-May-2024)^[20].

• Temu - The proceedings in the case of the Temu e-commerce platform related to the sale of non-compliant products in the EU, the algorithms surrounding content recommendation and the addictive design of the service, including issues relating to data availability (31-Oct-2024)^[21].

• EU Commission statements - In some cases, the Commission will issue a formal statement on an area of interest, distinct from an announcement of a formal proceedings action. Two examples in the 'press corner' database include a statement on the suspension of the TikTok Lite Reward programme in the EU (following a prior launch of formal proceedings) (24-Apr-2024)^[22] and one regarding steps announced by LinkedIn to comply with DSA provisions on targeted advertisements (07-Jul-2024)^[23], following a prior request for information (14-Mar-2024)^[24]. The former statement was followed by a subsequent press release announcing the permanent withdrawal of the TikTok rewards programme (05-Aug-2024)^[25].

• Other press releases - the EU Commission 'press corner' archive also includes a number of other releases discussing a range of platform-specific issues. Examples in which the DSA is also referenced are outlined below.

• Viagogo - The press release in this case outlines the commitment by the online ticket marketplace to improve terms and consumer information, following dialogue with the EU Commission and consumer authorities (16-May-2024)^[26].

• Vinted - The e-commerce marketplace for second-hand goods made improvements to the provision pricing and seller information, in order to bring their practices more in line with EU consumer law, and to the quality of its information on refund policies in cases of purchase of counterfeit goods or the non-delivery of items, again following dialogue with the Commission (18-Jun-2024)^[27].

• Meta - The EU Commission announced its coordination of action by national consumer protection authorities against Meta's 'pay or consent' model - essentially, a move by the platform to demand either a subscription fee or the use of customers' personal data in targeted advertising (22-Jul-2024)^[28].

• Temu - The e-commerce platform was urged by the Commission and national authorities to respect EU consumer protection laws, relating to a range of issues surrounding misleading content (such as fake discounts and reviews), measures to influence decision-making (including pressure selling and gamification), and hidden contact details for the platform (08-Nov-2024)^[29].

• Apple - This press release reports the notification to Apple of several potentially prohibited geoblocking practices, across a range of Apple Media Services platforms. Issues include the inability to access interfaces designed for use in other countries, no option for payment methods outside the country of account registration, and no ability to download apps offered in other countries (12-Nov-2024)^[30].

Discussion

Some of the issues raised by the EU Commission are still unresolved, but it is gratifying to see the organisation proactively taking actions against platforms on which problematic issues may be occurring - particularly those which impact consumer safety, have societal impacts, or are causing damage to brand owners. As time goes on, we hope to see the adoption of additional good practices by platforms within the scope of the DSA, such as the EUIPO recommendations for search engines outlined in their recent report^[31,32], and requirements for a more proactive approach to tackling infringements by e-commerce marketplaces, such as the platforms referenced in the 2024 Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy^[33,34].

As of the time of writing, no fines have yet been imposed by the Commission, but it may only be a matter of time before this takes place, especially if cases arise where platforms have made commitments, but fail to meet them. One potential example concerns TikTok which, in response to the proceedings referenced previously, has committed to withdraw its Lite Rewards programme from the EU^[35]. It also remains to be seen whether individual platforms may continue to challenge their designation status (i.e. as a VLOP or VLOSE), as a means of exempting themselves from obligations, as was done by Amazon when required to disclose its advertising information in an online archive^[36].  A final point to watch is how the newly-elected EU member state DSCs, responsible for local monitoring and enforcement of the DSA, may continue to develop in importance.

References

[1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/home/en?keywords=dsa

[2] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act_en

[3] https://www.iamstobbs.com/opinion/digital-markets-act-eu-confirms-big-tech-gatekeepers

[4] https://www.iamstobbs.com/opinion/what-is-the-digital-services-act-and-how-will-it-protect-brands-and-support-online-enforcement

[5] https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/what-we-do/the-business-environment/digital-single-market/eu-digital-single-market-aspects/digital-services-act/

[6] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2413

[7] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6763

[8] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2326

[9] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3047

[10] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3723

[11] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6709

[12] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3761

[13] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4953

[14] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_926

[15] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2227

[16] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6487

[17] https://circleid.com/posts/20220510-breaking-the-rules-on-counterfeit-sales-the-use-of-hidden-links

[18] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1485

[19] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373

[20] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2664

[21] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5622

[22] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_2290

[23] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_3172

[24] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-sends-request-information-linkedin-potentially-targeted-advertising-based-sensitive-data

[25] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4161

[26] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2631

[27] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3292

[28] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3862

[29] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5707

[30] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5727

[31] https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/reports/2024_Search_Engines/2024_Search_Engines_FullR_en.pdf

[32] 'Still haven't found what I'm looking for? - The EUIPO report on search-engine practices' [link TBC]

[33] https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2024%20Review%20of%20Notorious%20Markets%20of%20Counterfeiting%20and%20Piracy%20(final).pdf

[34] https://www.iamstobbs.com/opinion/notorious-a-b.i.g.-set-of-markets-for-counterfeiting-and-piracy-to-keep-an-eye-on

[35] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4161

[36] https://www.lewissilkin.com/insights/2024/04/15/amazon-ordered-to-disclose-advertising-information-in-online-archive-102j5bp

This article was first published on 13 February 2025 at:

https://www.iamstobbs.com/opinion/taking-action-eu-commission-proceedings-against-online-platforms-under-the-digital-services-act

January scams surrounding the fall and rise of TikTok and Trump

Introduction

January 2025 has seen two recent news stories of particular significance from a brand protection and online security point of view. The first of these surrounded the temporary ban in the US of Chinese-owned social media platform TikTok, on security grounds^[1]. The second story also concerns Trump who, in the days prior to his inauguration, launched a meme-inspired official cryptocurrency (Official Trump, or $TRUMP)^[2], the value of which had climbed from its initial price of $0.18 to $72 by 7am EST on the following Sunday, making the President an estimated $50 billion^[3,4].

Many previous analyses have noted the links between real-world events and subsequent spikes in associated infringing activity, as a means of taking advantage of increased levels of public interest and search volumes. These two new stories - particularly in view of the amounts of revenue with which the brands in question are associated - are likely to be no exception.

Infringement landscape

There are a few obvious possible infringement 'hooks' in these cases. For TikTok, many observers^[5,6] predicted a rise in scams of a range of types, such as those relating to purported methods for circumventing the ban (such as fraudulent VPNs) or offering fake versions of the app. In addition, with the push of would-be former TikTok customers towards the alternative platform RedNote (also known as LittleRedBook or Xiaohongshu)^[7], this brand may have been, and still be, subject to similar issues. Additionally, it is likely to also subject to an increase in infringements targeting other brands on the platform itself, in view of its increasing popularity^[8]. The Trump coin is also likely to be targeted by fake versions and a range of other scams typically associated with cryptocurrencies, a common forum in which Web2/Web3 'crossover' content is manifested^[9].

In this article, we consider the landscape of newly-registered ('Web2') domains relating to the TikTok/RedNote and Trump stories, as a proxy for the overall infringement landscape, and offering a dataset which is easily searched and analysed.

The datasets make use of (gTLD) domain-name zone-file data (as of 20-Jan-2025), considering the following searches for 'high-risk' domains:

1. Domains containing 'tiktok' and any of the 'high-risk' keywords: 'vpn', 'download', 'login' or 'access' (216 domains)
2. Domains containing 'rednote' at the start, or 'rednote' plus any of the 'high-risk' keywords: 'vpn', 'download', 'login' or 'access' (514 domains)
3. Domains containing 'trump' and any of the 'high-risk' keywords: 'coin', 'meme', 'crypto', 'bitcoin' or 'fight'^[10] (1,703 domains)

Looking at the dates of registrations of the domains (where available via automated look-up), there is a striking spike of activity around the dates of emergence of the associated news stories (Figure 1), which is significantly disproportionate to the pre-existing 'background' levels of activity (average daily number of equivalent registrations in Q4 2024 is 0.196 for 'tiktok', 0.054 for 'rednote' and 1.620 for 'trump'). The numbers of registrations for 'tiktok' are surprisingly somewhat low, but it may be that some of the domains registered in the few days prior to the analysis are not yet reflected in the zone file data.

Figure 1: Daily numbers of registrations of 'high-risk' 'tiktok', 'rednote' and 'trump' domains, since 01-Jan-2025

Nevertheless, it is clear that a range of infringements of various types are already in place. Of the 'high-risk' domains, 1,064 produce some sort of website response (97 for 'tiktok', 187 for 'rednote', 780 for 'trump'), and Figures 2 and 3 show some examples of live sites of potential concern - all registered since the start of January.

Figure 2: Examples of websites of concern associated with 'high-risk' 'tiktok' or 'rednote' domains registered since 01-Jan-2025 (SLDs^[11] shown in each case) (top to bottom):

• Potential phishing (rednote)
• Potentially non-legitimate / malicious VPN downloads (freevpnfortiktok)
• Potentially non-legitimate / malicious app downloads (rednoteapk, rednoteapp, rednote)
• Sites purporting to offer other associated services - file back-ups (downloadtiktoks), sale of followers (rednotefollower)

Figure 3: Examples of websites of concern associated with 'high-risk' 'trump' domains registered since 01-Jan-2025 (SLDs shown in each case) (top to bottom):

• Purported sale or distribution of Official Trump cryptocurrency (gettingtrumpsmemes, firsttrumpmemecoin, officialtrumpmeme, buy-trump-coin)
• Use of Trump name in unauthorised / third-party cryptocurrency (aitrumpcoin, pepetrumpcoin, etrumpcoin, babytrumpmemes)

Discussion and Conclusion

It is evident that these two prominent stories have - predictably - triggered a spike in infringements, with the risks in these cases taking a number of forms. These include potential phishing, distribution of potentially malicious content, fraud, and unauthorised brand use and claimed affiliation.

As ever, the conclusions to be drawn from these observations are clear. At times of increased online interest and high-profile news stories, consumers are advised to remain vigilant and be aware of the scope for potential scams. Brand owners should also take extra care to proactively monitor for (and take enforcement activity against) infringements which may affect them and their customer base.

References

[1] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cjde3p0rnjgo

[2] https://gettrumpmemes.com/

[3] https://www.axios.com/2025/01/18/trump-meme-coin-25-billion

[4] https://eu.usatoday.com/story/money/2025/01/18/trump-meme-coin-price-crypto/77802704007/

[5] https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7286778120236355584/

[6] https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7286760863796011008/

[7] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c2475l7zpqyo

[8] https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/article/rednote-growing-tiktok-rival-rife-brand-impersonation-rights-holders-warned

[9] https://www.iamstobbs.com/opinion/web2/web3-crossover-brand-related-crypto-infringements

[10] These keywords were selected on the basis of their association with the Trump 'Fight, Fight, Fight' meme, by which the new coin is inspired; indeed, the currency is partly held by a Trump-owned company named 'Fight Fight Fight LLC'

[11] Second-level domain names - i.e. the part of the domain name to the left of the dot

This article was first published on 30 January 2025 at:

https://www.iamstobbs.com/opinion/january-scams-surrounding-the-fall-and-rise-of-tiktok-and-trump

Notorious: a B.I.G. set of markets to keep an eye on for counterfeiting and piracy

Introduction

This month has seen the publication of the 2024 version of the Review of Notorious Markets for Counterfeiting and Piracy (the 'Notorious Markets List' (NML)), by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). The annual review presents a summary of key online and real-world markets found to be associated with brand infringements, specifically counterfeiting (trademark infringement) and piracy (copyright infringement)^[1], and thereby highlighting key platforms and areas of focus for brand protection programmes depending on the type of brand owner and the kinds of infringements to which they are subjected. This year's report^[2] also includes a specific focus on illicit online pharmacies, reflecting the significant risks posed by counterfeit medicines.

Overview

One of the key components of the report is the list of online platforms which have been repeatedly found to facilitate infringing activity. The sites in question fall into a number of key categories, which are outlined below (with the individual sites assigned into 'best-fit' categories). In cases where the platforms have a focus in a specific country, this is also referenced below, using its country code in square brackets.

• e-commerce platforms
• The platforms highlighted in the report are those which contribute specifically to the trade in counterfeit or otherwise infringing goods, through a lack of adequate mediating policies, monitoring and tools.
• Specific platforms:
• General marketplace and shopping platforms - Bukalapak (bukalapak.com) [ID], DHgate (dhgate.com) [CN], Douyin Shangcheng (Douyin Mall) [CN], IndiaMART [IN], Pinduoduo (pinduoduo.com) [CN], Shopee (shopee.com) [SG], Taobao (taobao.com) [CN]
• Classified advertisement site - Avito (avito.ru) [RU]

• 'Bulletproof' hosting providers
• These are Internet service providers offering web-hosting services for infringing sites, and which typically advertise their non-compliance to enforcement notices as a business model.
• Specific providers: Amarutu, DDoS-Guard (ddos-guard.net) [RU], FlokiNET [IS / Europe], Squitter (squitter.eu) [possibly NL], Virtual Systems (vsys.host) [UA]

• Cyberlockers
• These act as hosting and content storage sites for copyrighted digital content, and often facilitate file-sharing through linking and streaming sites. In many cases, they are incentivised to share popular content to drive web traffic, by virtue of their reliance on advertising revenue, and may also share revenue with contributors of popular material.
• Specific sites: 1fichier (1fichier.com) [FR], Baidu Wangpan [CN], Krakenfiles (krakenfiles.com), Libgen (libgen.rs, libgen.is, libgen.li, libgen.st, library.lol, libgen.rocks, libgen.gs, annas-archive.org, annas-archive.gs) [RU], Rapidgator (rapidgator.net, rg.to) [RU], Sci-Hub (sci-hub.se, sci-hub.ru, sci-hub.st, annas-archive.org, annas-archive.gs) [RU], Streamtape (streamtape.com) [FR]

• Torrent websites
• These are platforms providing access to copyrighted content which is available for download via the BitTorrent file-sharing protocol.
• Specific sites: 1337x (1337x.to, 1337x.tw), Rutracker (rutracker.org) [RU], ThePirateBay (thepiratebay.org), Torrent Galaxy (torrentgalaxy.to, torrentglaxy.mx [sic], torrentgalaxy.buzz, tgx.rs, tgx.sb) (BitTorrent streaming), YTS / YIFY (yts.mx) [BG]

• General piracy sites
• These offer the sharing of copyrighted content in other general senses, relying on (for example) associated cyberlockers for content hosting.
• Specific sites:
• Streaming services - GenIPTV (genip.tv), MagisTV (magistv.net, oficialmagistv.com, magistv.digital, magistv.la, magisla.com, magistvoficial.com, magistv-venezuela.com) [Latin America], Vegamovies (vegamovies.in, vegamovies.boo, vegamovies.ren) [IN]
• 'Stream-ripping' sites (circumventing the content-protection measures of other content providers) - SaveFrom (savefrom.net, savef.net, savefrom.live, savefrom.app, save-from.net, savefrom.best, save-from.biz), Y2mate (y2mate.com, yt1s.com)
• 'Repacking' site (providing access to compressed versions of digital files) - FitGirl-Repacks (fitgirl-repacks.site) (video games)
• General piracy - Cuevana (cuevana.biz, cuevana3.eu, cuevana3.ch, cuevana.pro, cuevana.si, cuevana4.me, cuevana3cc.me) [Latin America], HiAnime (hianime.to), Nsw2u (nsw2u.com, game-2u.com, ps4pkg.com, bigngame.com), Unknowncheats (unknowncheats.me) (offers download of game cheat codes, which may include copyrighted source code), VKontakte (VK) (vk.com) (social media) [RU], WHMCS Smarters (whmcssmarters.com, iptvsmarters.com) [IN]

• Pirate content management systems
• These provide libraries of infringing content, obtained through crawling and scraping of third-party data sources.
• Specific site: 2embed (2embed.cc)

It is worth noting that many of the providers referenced in the report are geared towards digital piracy, which remains a significant issue generally for rights owners. A 2024 report by the EUIPO estimates that piracy accounts overall for about ten Internet accesses per Internet user per month on average^[3], and MUSO provides an estimate of around 229 billion visits to piracy sites in 2023^[4], affecting predominantly the TV (104 B), publishing (64 B), film (30 B), music (17 B) and software (15 B) industries.

However, counterfeiting also remains a major problem, utilising both online and physical channels. The World Customs Organisation's Illicit Trade Report 2023 references 98 million items comprising intellectual property violations intercepted through over 48,000 seizures (excluding US data), dominated by accessories, clothing and footwear entering into the US, Europe, Chile and Mexico^[5].

Furthermore, the Notorious Markets report includes information on key geographic markets of concern, where the trade in counterfeits may be addressable through effective on-the-ground or customs initiatives, border controls, and/or appropriate legislation. Specific reference is given to locations in South America (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru) and the Far East (Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam), plus Canada, India, Kyrgyz Republic, Mexico, Russia, Türkiye (Turkey) and UAE.

Discussion and Conclusion

How representative is the information given in the NML? It is noteworthy that social-media platforms and many US-based marketplaces are essentially unrepresented in the report (apart from the inclusion of VK), despite the significant levels of activity observed across these channels - particularly on the various Meta platforms (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Threads), a concern echoed by other organisations such as the American Apparel & Footwear Association^[6]. It is also significant that WeChat has been removed from the list (in favour of Douyin Mall, part of the ByteDance group) since the previous edition, in part due to the introduction of tools to deal with infringements. Taobao's continued appearance in the list remains (somewhat) controversial, particularly in view of the platform's increased engagement with rights holders and government, but many stakeholders continue to take the view that improvements to the site's process for reporting infringements are still required^[7]. There is also a growth in commentary (particularly in China) that some elements of the list (notably the large numbers of inclusions of Chinese platforms) may be politically or commercially motivated^[8,9], following similar comments the previous year^[10].

In addition, commentary from the US Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO)^[11] stresses the continuing role of online marketplaces as a key channel type of interest, and mentions a number of additional platforms excluded from the list, but which continue to be of concern (AliExpress [CN], Facebook Marketplace, Noon [Middle East], Temu [CN] and - again - WeChat [CN]). There were also a number of other significant nominations for the NML (such as Shein and TikTok Shop) which failed to make the final edition^[12]. It is also worth noting that the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) provides resources relating to the IP protection programmes offered by a number of marketplaces with which they collaborate^[13], and none of these (with the exception of the Alibaba Group, which includes Taobao) are included in the NML; this is perhaps an indication of the power of the provision of rights protection initiatives by marketplaces.

Overall, it would be beneficial to see a greater degree of consensus on the marketplaces and other platforms - and the associated geographical focuses - which should be included in the NML going forward. This would help inform relevant policies, and give brand owners a clearer view of where the main areas of concern actually are. It is worth noting that many of the platforms referenced will need to comply with new rules covered by the Digital Services Act (DSA)^[14]; we are already starting to see the commencement of proceedings by the EU Commission against platforms which are key focuses of infringing activity, such as Temu^[15,16] and Shein^[17,18], both of which have been designated as Very Large Online Platforms under the DSA framework.

References

[1] https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2025/january/ustr-releases-2024-review-notorious-markets-counterfeiting-and-piracy

[2] https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2024%20Review%20of%20Notorious%20Markets%20of%20Counterfeiting%20and%20Piracy%20(final).pdf

[3] https://www.euipo.europa.eu/en/publications/online-copyright-infringement-in-the-european-union-films-music-publications-software-and-tv-2017-2023

[4] https://www.muso.com/piracy-by-industry-report-2023

[5] https://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/activities-and-programmes/illicit-trade-report/itr_2023_en.pdf

[6] https://www.fashiondive.com/news/meta-facebook-instagram-notorious-markets-counterfeit-list/729053/

[7] https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/article/notorious-markets-list-2024-wechat-removed-and-douyin-mall-added-social-media-platforms-once-again-ignored

[8] https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202501/1326622.shtml

[9] https://thebambooworks.com/douyin-in-wechat-out-of-latest-u-s-notorious-markets-piracy-list/

[10] https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202401/1306451.shtml

[11] https://ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/2024-IPO-Notorious-Markets-Comments.pdf

[12] https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/article/associations-reiterate-calls-include-us-social-media-platforms-in-notorious-markets-list

[13] https://www.euipo.europa.eu/en/observatory/enforcement/tools/protecting-ip-rights-e-commerce-marketplaces

[14] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act_en

[15] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5622

[16] https://www.euronews.com/next/2024/10/31/eu-commission-probes-chinese-marketplace-temu-under-platform-rules

[17] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-requests-information-online-marketplaces-temu-and-shein-compliance-digital-services-act

[18] https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/temu-shein-ordered-provide-info-eu-tech-rules-compliance-by-july-12-2024-06-28/

This article was first published on 28 January 2025 at:

https://www.iamstobbs.com/opinion/notorious-a-b.i.g.-set-of-markets-for-counterfeiting-and-piracy-to-keep-an-eye-on